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Critical (necessary or sufficient) features in categorization have a long history, but the 
empirical evidence makes their existence questionable. Nevertheless, there are some 
cases that suggest critical feature effects. The purpose of the present work is to offer 
some insight into why classification decisions might misleadingly appear as if they 
involve critical features. Utilizing Tversky’s (1977) contrast model of similarity, we 
suggest that when an object has a sparser representation, changing any of its features 
is more likely to lead to a change in identity, than it would in objects which have 
richer representations. Experiment 1 provides a basic test of this suggestion with 
artificial stimuli, whereby objects with a rich or a sparse representation were 
transformed by changing one of their features. As expected, we observed more 
identity judgments in the former case. Experiment 2 further confirms our hypothesis, 
with realistic stimuli, by assuming that superordinate categories have sparser 
representations than subordinate ones. These results offer some insight into the way 
feature changes may or may not lead to identity changes in classification decisions.  
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Introduction  
How concepts are represented is an issue of fundamental importance in understanding 
human psychology. Many categorization accounts utilize some notion of similarity. 
For our purposes, the key characteristic of such accounts is that they predict 
gradedness in the way new instances are classified, in judgments of typicality, in 
assessing category membership etc. (e.g., Barsalou, 1985; Hampton, 1995; Nosofsky, 
1991; Pothos, 2005; Smith and Minda, 1998). According to a radically different 
proposal, there are critical features  (or a belief in such features), the presence or 
absence of which determines category membership, independently of overall 
resemblance. In other words, critical features automatically determine category 
membership, regardless of any other information. For example, consider the rule ‘if 
an insect has yellow and black stripes, then it must be a bee’. This means that when 
seeing any insect with yellow and black stripes, we are compelled to conclude, by 
logical inference (modus ponens), that the creature we are dealing with is a bee. 
Category judgments that involve critical features are absolute and inflexible (e.g., the 
above rule is wrong; what about wasps?). However, from a cognitive efficiency point 
of view, they do allow quick, specific decisions. Do critical features exist, at least for 
some concepts? If yes, human categorization should be understood in terms of at least 
two, qualitatively different, systems: a system based on rules and a system based on 
similarity (note that the putative role of logical inference as would be implied by such 
rules has been criticized in other areas of cognition; e.g., Chater & Oaksford, 1993; 
Oaksford & Chater, 1994; regarding the distinction between rules and similarity, see, 
e.g., Hahn & Chater, 1998; Pothos, 2005; Sloman & Rips, 1998).  
 Rips (1989; Keil, 1989) presented his participants with a story of a bird that 
suffered from exposure to toxic waste. As a result, the appearance of the bird changed 
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to such an extent that it looked like an insect. This was unfortunate for the bird, 
however, it still managed to mate with other birds of its kind and the offspring looked 
normal. The mean categorization ratings provided by Rips’s participants indicated the 
changed bird to be more likely to be a bird. Therefore, ‘mating’ might be considered a 
sufficient feature for the category of birds, that is, a feature that guarantees 
classification into the category of birds. However, things might be birds even without 
an ability to mate with other members of that species. Necessary features, by contrast, 
are essential for an object to be considered a member of a category; for example, 
being ‘male’ is a necessary feature for the category of bachelors. Necessary and 
sufficient features can be called ‘critical’ features, to indicate that their presence can 
critically affect a classification decision. This finding of Rips has been widely 
considered as evidence for the existence of critical features (for an overview of related 
research see Rips, 2001). 
 Note that many researchers have advocated factors that could determine the 
relative importance of features. For example, Sloman, Love, and Ahn (1998; cf. 
Rehder & Hastie, 2004) suggested that numerous causal links between a feature and 
other features increase its importance and used a measure of feature mutability 
(whether one feature can change without changing the other features) to determine 
feature importance. Corter and Gluck (1992; Gosselin & Schyns, 2001) provided 
probabilistic measures of a feature’s utility in, e.g., determining category membership. 
However, postulating features that can be ‘very important’ is a very different proposal 
from postulating (critical) features that can logically determine category membership; 
the influence of the former in a classification decision can be reduced, if there is 
compelling evidence, but not the influence of the latter.  
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 A variant of the critical features theory is psychological essentialism: 
according to this approach entities do not actually possess critical features, but people 
behave as if they did—and so sometimes make classification decisions consistent with 
a belief in critical features (e.g., Malt, 1990; Malt et al., 1999; Medin & Ortony, 
1989). For example, the most fundamental feature of a living thing is its DNA; but the 
majority of people will have never observed a creature’s DNA. The problem with 
essentialism as a psychological theory is that, if essences are not known (or do not 
even exist!), it seems difficult to construct well-controlled supporting experiments 
(for attempts see Gelman, 2003, Hampton, Estes, & Simmons, 2007; Pothos, Hahn, & 
Prat-Sala, 2009).  
 In our research, we have tried to examine the robustness of Rips’s result and 
hence the evidence for critical features. Pothos and Hahn (2000) presented a number 
of variations of Rips’s main scenario. One condition involved describing a creature 
that looked like a crow and could mate with other crows (normal offspring), but was 
in fact a space alien. Most participants considered this crow-like creature to not be a 
crow. Since the features of the space-crows were identical to the features of the crows, 
and the space-crows were not considered crows, mating (or any other feature) could 
not have been a critical feature for the category of crows. Therefore, Pothos and 
Hahn’s (2000) finding was against critical features. Since Murphy and Medin (1985), 
several researchers have advocated the importance of naïve theories in categorization, 
and this finding appears to support such an approach over and above critical features 
(and possibly essentialism as well).  
 Such research casts doubt on the existence of critical features. Other 
researchers have also failed to find consistent evidence for critical features. For 
example, Larochelle, Cousineau, and Archambault (2005) observed that reported 
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necessary features were not actually treated as such in decisions about category 
membership. Also, Hampton, Estes, and Simmons (2007) argued that high variance in 
individual participant performance could have partly accounted for the dissociation 
Rips reported and also found that changing particular aspects of the stimuli Rips used 
eliminated essentialist classification. However, researchers have often reported effects 
that look like critical feature effects (for example, Rips, 1989). Our purpose is to shed 
light on such effects. Specifically, under what circumstances will a categorization 
decision appear as if it involves a critical feature, even if it does not?  
 In Rips’s study, it is possible that ‘mating’ is not a critical feature in general, 
but merely seems like one when few other features are present. A general similarity 
model, Tversky’s (1977) contrast model, readily predicts that the fewer the features in 
the representation of an object, the more likely it is that changing a single feature will 
alter the object’s identity. For example, consider stimuli composed of four features, 
that we indicate as A1A2A3A4 or stimuli composed of eight features, indicated as 
A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8. In both cases we change one feature, so that the changed stimuli 
can be represented as A1A2A3B or A1A2A3A4A5A6A7B. Everything else being equal, 
we believe that the feature change from A4 to B is more likely to look like a critical 
feature compared to the feature change from A8 to B. In other words, we suggest that 
a change in object identity will be less likely when many other features are present 
and intact (a case of rich or complex representation) and more likely when few other 
features are present (a case of sparse or simple representation). For example, a 
straightforward application of Tversky’s (1977) ideas in the above example would 
suggest that in the sparse case similarity is proportional to 3 (common features) – 1 
(different feature) = 2, while in the complex case 7 –1 = 6. Therefore, the similarity 
between the original and the changed object would be greater in the complex case 
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compared to the sparse case and so we predict more judgments of ‘identity’ in the 
complex case. Note that Tversky (1977) provided several empirical demonstrations 
that complexity impacts similarity in this way.  
 This raises a question in relation to Rips’s results: Given that Rips did observe 
results which appeared to indicate that ‘mating’ was a critical feature, are we forced to 
conclude that the representation for the birds/ insects in Rips’s experiment was sparse 
(so that the change of a single, prominent feature looked like a chance in a critical 
feature)? This is likely because participants in Rips’s experiment had no information 
about the presented bird, other than that it could still mate with other birds after the 
accident. That is, the presentation of information in the experiment possibly 
encouraged a sparse representation of the bird in Rips’s story. Having said this, as 
noted above, the conceptual representation of natural kinds is a complicated issue in 
that, for example, classification of natural kinds may be (partly?) driven by a belief in 
essences—in the relevant Experiment 2 reported here we restrict the examination to 
artifacts.  
Hampton (1995) presented an argument broadly similar to ours. He showed 
how highly weighted features in a prototype can look like defining features, in that, 
unless a test instance has these features, it is impossible for the test instance to be 
similar enough to a prototype. In other words, Hampton’s suggestion was that critical 
feature effects could be understood in the context of a similarity-based theory of 
categorization.  
 Experiment 1 is a straightforward examination of our idea with artificial 
stimuli, required to validate the experimental design. Experiment 2 is the critical test 
of our hypothesis. In Experiment 2, the same objects and corresponding feature 
changes are described to participants. However, in one condition the objects are 
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described in a superordinate way and in another in a subordinate way; this is a 
manipulation which affects the number of category features. Will exactly the same 
feature change look like a critical feature change in the superordinate case, but not in 
the subordinate case? If yes, then we will have provided a simple similarity account of 
how categorization decisions, which look like they involve critical features, can occur.  
 
Experiment 1 
In this experiment we examine the intuition that feature changes are more likely to be 
perceived as critical if the corresponding object representation is sparse. In other 
words, we predict that A1A2A3A4 and A1A2A3B are less likely to be considered to 
belong to the same category than A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8 and A1A2A3A4A5A6A7B, as 
would be predicted by Tversky’s (1977) feature contrast model.  
 
Participants and design   
One-hundred undergraduate students from Bangor University or Winchester 
University took part in the study for a payment or course credit. The number of 
participants in the two conditions of the study (between participants design), that we 
shall call simple (sparse) and complex (rich), were 51 and 49 respectively. The two 
conditions were identical but for the complexity of the stimuli used: in the simple 
condition, each of the stimuli we employed was comprised of four features, while in 
the complex one of eight features.  
 
Materials  
Each participant in both the simple and the complex condition saw six training items 
and six test items. All participants saw the same training items. However, there were 
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three different sets of (six) test items each, corresponding to counterbalancing the 
form of the test items (described shortly). All training items had the same features. 
However, in different items the texture of the features varied. For example, in one 
item the texture for a feature might be a continuous thick line, while in another item it 
would be a dotted line. As there were six training items, each feature was instantiated 
with six different textures. The rationale for adopting this approach is that we wanted 
to model a situation in which there would be different instantiations of the same 
features. For example, think of a dog: different dogs have different legs, ears, tails etc. 
Likewise, the training items in this experiment were meant to have the ‘same’ 
features, but instantiated somewhat differently. Of course, there is no single perfect 
design to capture such an intuition, however, the consistency of the results across 
participants suggests that our assumptions were broadly valid.  
 The form of each training item for the simple condition was a square enclosed 
by a circle with two triangles on the side of the circle and a cross on top of it. The 
training items in the complex condition were analogous and were created by adding 
four features to each of the items in the simple condition. In this way, the simple and 
complex conditions are as comparable as possible. The additional features used for 
the complex items were a diamond beneath the circle. The diamond enclosed a star 
and had two rectangles on its sides. An ellipse was attached below the diamond. The 
features used for both the simple and complex condition were selected so that 
intuitively they were roughly equally salient (this was informally assessed by 
independent judgments from the authors). Examples of the stimuli are shown in 
Figure 1.  
 Each test item was identical to a training item but for a single feature. Recall, 
there were three sets of test items; these corresponded to a (partial) counterbalancing 
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of which features were changed. In the first set of test items for the simple condition 
we created six stimuli that were identical to the training items except that there was no 
square in the middle but rather a whirling pattern; all six test stimuli had a whirling 
pattern center and for each stimulus the texture of the whirling pattern was different. 
Two more sets of test items were generated in an analogous way, by changing 
different features, so as to accommodate for the possibility that participants would 
perceive the change of a particular feature as more important than the change of other 
features. The three sets of test items for the complex condition were created simply by 
attaching the extra four features to the test items for the simple condition (Figure 1).  
To clarify, each item had a ‘simple’ version and a ‘complex’ one. The 
difference between the two is that in the latter case four additional features were 
added. However, crucially, in both cases the same feature was changed. In other 
words, the simple and complex conditions were completely matched in terms of 
which features were changed. Finally, each stimulus in both conditions was printed 
individually on an A4 sheet.  
 
Procedure 
Participants received printed instructions informing them that they were about to see a 
set of objects, all of which belonged to the same category, which we called the 
category of ‘Chomps’. They then received the training items in a folder and were 
allowed to observe them in any way they wished. Once they had done so, they were 
given new instructions telling them that they would shortly see another set of items 
and that they would have to decide which of the new items belonged to the same 
category as the training ones. Participants indicated their response for an item by 
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writing it down on the sheet on which the item was printed. Participants were tested 
individually and the experiment lasted about five minutes.  
 
Results 
We were interested in participants who considered the test items to be primarily in the 
same category as the training ones vs. participants who did not do so (i.e., more test 
items classified as ‘Chomps’ vs. ‘Non-Chomps’), since the former could be assumed 
to be categorizing (primarily) on the basis of similarity and the latter (primarily) on 
the basis of a critical feature. Some participants classified the same number of test 
items as ‘Chomps’ and ‘Non-Chomps’. Such intermediate responses are neutral with 
respect to the hypotheses of interest, and so were eliminated from this analysis. There 
were nine intermediate responses in the simple condition and seven in the complex 
one, so that the results of 16 participants (out of 100) were not considered. 
Participants were more likely to consider most of the test items as ‘Chomps’ in the 
complex condition (many features) than in the simple one (few features): 
chi2(1)=8.64, p=.003 (Table 1). 
-----------------------Table 1----------------------- 
 The above analysis allows a quick appreciation of the pattern of results. An 
alternative analysis, which does not lead to the exclusion of any participants, is 
possible by assigning a score of 0—6 to each participant, depending on how many test 
items he/she considered in the same category as the training items (note that this 
information was not available for one participant in the simple condition). The scores 
of participants in the simple and complex conditions was then compared with a t-test, 
which was found highly significant: t(97)=3.276, p=.001. The mean score of 
participants in the simple and complex conditions were 1.64 (SD=2.05) and 3.10 
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(SD=2.38) respectively, showing that participants in the latter condition made more 
‘Chomps’ (positive) responses.  
 
 Discussion  
We used artificial stimuli composed of four or eight features and investigated how 
participants categorized these stimuli when we changed one of their features. Overall, 
participants were reluctant to consider the test items in the same category as the 
training ones (for both conditions together only 31 participants considered the 
majority of test items to be ‘Chomps’, compared to the 53 who did not). Importantly, 
however, participants were more likely to consider the test items as belonging to the 
same category as the original ones, with the complex items as opposed to with the 
simple items, consistently with our prediction and the application of Tversky’s (1977) 
model of similarity. The converse, null hypothesis would have been that changing 
some features would result in changes in category membership, while changing other 
features would not, regardless of how many other features were present. If that were 
true, then there would have been no systematic differences in the proportion of object 
identity judgments between the simple and complex conditions.   
 One can ask whether individual feature salience might undermine confidence 
in our conclusions. It is hard to see how this is possible. For example, we partly 
counterbalanced the changed feature within each of the two conditions. Also, in both 
the simple and the complex condition the same features were changed. Given that 
across these manipulations participants’ performance indicated a consistent preference 
for ‘same’ judgments in the complex condition, we conclude that our methodological 
assumptions were valid. Another issue is whether the instructions might have biased 
participants to seek an equal number of ‘Chomps’ and ‘Non-Chomps’ classifications 
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in test. However, this was not the case. For example, in the simple condition, there 
were 27 participants who selected no test items as Chomps, 6 who selected 5 or 6 
items as Chomps, with the rest in-between. So, apparently, participants did not feel 
constrained to select an equal number of test items as Chomps and Non-Chomps. 
 
Experiment 2 
With artificial stimuli there was no reason to expect a violation of the predictions 
from Tversky’s (1977) model, because for artificial stimuli there would be little basis 
to consider a particular feature as critical. With realistic stimuli, by contrast, we often 
have strong intuitions that certain features might be critical ones. Accordingly, 
eliminating a critical feature should always lead to a change in the object’s identity, 
regardless of whether the representation of the object is manipulated to be sparser or 
more extensive. Thus, Experiment 2 is the main test of our account of how effects 
mimicking critical feature effects can arise.  
How can we determine whether an object’s representation is sparse or 
complex? Asking participants to provide feature lists may be good for determining 
characteristic or diagnostic features, but possibly less appropriate for identifying all 
the features relevant to a representation. Moreover, the representation for a concept is 
bound to be different for different people. For example, if a person is unfamiliar with 
a concept, her representation of that concept would plausibly be sparse, even if 
averaged data suggests otherwise. In other words, we required a way for determining 
certain concept representations to be sparse, while others complex, for each one of our 
participants.  
 We made the minimal assumption that the more general a concept, the fewer 
the features the objects within this category have in common, simply because the 
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more abstract or general a concept the more diverse the range of objects that comprise 
it (Komatsu, 1992). That is, more general concepts should be represented with fewer 
features relative to corresponding more specific ones (cf. Rosch et al., 1976). Thus, if 
two concepts are related to each other as subordinate and superordinate, then the latter 
will necessarily have a sparser representation relative to the former. Consider, for 
example, the concept of ‘vehicle’ in relation to the concept of ‘car’. The former 
concept includes as members bicycles, buses, trains, motorcycles etc., as well as cars. 
For such a diverse range of objects to cohere together, the concept representation has 
to involve relatively few features. For example, while all vehicles are used for 
transportation, they could have any number of seats, accommodate different numbers 
of passengers, etc. By contrast, the members of the concept of car have several 
common features with each other; in other words, the concept car will have a more 
extensive representation compared to the concept vehicle. These ideas are illustrated 
in Figure 2.  
----------------------Figure 2------------------------ 
In related previous work, Hampton (1982) found violations in transitivity in 
class inclusion relations; in other words, he identified cases such that instance X 
would be a member of Y, Y or Z, but X would not be a member of Z. Concept X 
would be most specific, Y of intermediate specificity, and Z the most general. 
Hampton’s result is analogous to the one we are trying to obtain, but for a crucial 
difference. We are interested in whether a classification of an object would change as 
a result of changing a particular (assumed critical) feature. Hampton did not employ 
any feature changes and, indeed, he was only interested in identifying some concepts 
for which a violation of transitivity could be observed. By contrast, we sought to 
identify an effect that would consistently apply in a group of stimuli.  
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 We decided to use a range of simple artifact concepts. If artifact categories 
have critical features, then these should correspond to their intended function (Bloom, 
1996; note, Estes, 2003). For example, the category of hammers would not exist 
without the notion of driving nails into wood—it appears that many artifact categories 
are created from a need to express certain functions.  
 
Participants  
One hundred and twenty two experimentally naïve participants, all second year 




We identified everyday objects with a view to alter one of their features that we 
deemed necessary for the way they are categorized. For example, for an object to be a 
hammer, the object must be sturdy enough to enable the applications a hammer is 
typically used for. The validity of our assumptions regarding which features are 
important for object identity was assessed post-experimentally, in terms of whether 
eliminating these features resulted in changes in object identity.  
 An important issue in the design of the materials is to ensure that the features 
that are to be changed have equal relevance to both subordinate and superordinate 
categories. The key assumption is that, if critical features exist, then subordinate and 
corresponding superordinate categories must have analogous critical features. In other 
words, if a feature can be considered as critical for a subordinate category, then a 
correspondingly more general feature would be likewise considered as critical for the 
parent superordinate category. For example, assume that the critical feature for a 
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‘hammer’ is its function, namely its capacity to be used to drive nails into wood. We 
can also reasonably suggest that the critical feature for the same hammer categorized 
at the superordinate level as a ‘tool’ is this functional capacity. In this case the 
capacity is now an instance of the general tool function of ‘being used to build or 
make things’. Therefore, if the critical features assumption of categorization is 
correct, then a hammer-like object that turns out not to be a hammer, cannot still be a 
tool, or vice versa, since in both cases effectively the same critical feature would be 
missing.  
 Of course, one could change a feature at the subordinate level in a way that 
leads to an alternative subordinate level classification under the same parent 
superordinate category. For example, one could imagine a tool like a hammer, but 
which has a pointy head, rather than a flat head. Such situations are trivial, since all 
they show is that we can have several different subordinate level categories under the 
same parent superordinate category. We do not consider such situations in the present 
experiment.  
A question is how we could support the assumption that critical features at the 
superordinate and corresponding subordinate category levels are equivalent. 
Empirically, if the critical feature hypothesis is wrong (as it turned out to be the case), 
then we expect that the importance of any particular feature will be contextual: If 
there are many other features present, changing a particular feature may not be very 
significant, but if there are few other features present, then any particular feature 
change may lead to a change in object identity. We think the most convincing route 
for addressing this issue is arguing a priori that, if critical features exist, and if a 
feature can be assumed to be critical at the subordinate level, then a closely analogous 
feature can be assumed to be critical at the superordinate level. 
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Table 2 shows the 11 objects we used and the actual question description. The 
critical column is the ‘changed feature’ one. It can be seen that the changed feature 
readily implies a sensible critical feature at the subordinate possible classification, and 
a directly analogous critical feature at the superordinate classification. For example, 
for the piano/ musical instrument pair, the assumed subordinate/ superordinate 
features are the ability to produce music of a particular kind/ the ability to produce 
music;  for the football/ equipment pair, the features are used in soccer/ used in a 
sport; etc. Note, finally, that in specifying the subordinate/ superordinate pairs, we 
took care to ensure that the category terms we considered superordinate were fully 
inclusive of the corresponding subordinate ones (i.e., all the members of the 
subordinate concept were a subset of the members of the corresponding superordinate 
one),  
-----------------------Table 2----------------------- 
The objects were described either in terms of a subordinate category (e.g., a 
hammer would be described as a ‘hammer’) or a superordinate one (e.g., a hammer 
would be described as a ‘tool’). Note that we are not interested in whether the 
description we provided for our stimuli corresponds to a basic level categorization or 
not, but rather in whether the two category terms are such so that one is subordinate to 
the other.  
 The actual materials used in the experiment had the form of a series of the 11 
stimuli printed individually on A5 sheets. The order of stimuli was randomized for 
each participant. Each stimulus consisted of a line or two describing it. For example, 
for the currency stimulus the description we provided was ‘After a series of financial 
disasters, the economy of a country collapses so that the country’s currency is 
worthless, and cannot be used to buy anything.’ We tried to make the descriptions as 
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concise and specific as possible. Below the description, participants were prompted to 
decide whether the stimulus belonged or not to the category we were interested in. 
Continuing with the same example, (different) participants would read ‘Are items of 
the currency still money?’ or ‘Are items of the currency still coins?’ ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ 
boxes were printed next to the questions so that participants could indicate their 
response. The stimuli were further illustrated with a picture in the cases of the doll, 
the football, the hammer, the piano, and the fakirs’ bed. In the other cases, it was not 
considered necessary to provide a picture, or it was not possible to identify an 
appropriate intuitive picture.  
 
Procedure 
We wanted all participants to make some subordinate and some superordinate 
categorization decisions, to avoid any confound that might arise from individual 
biases regarding more general or more specific categorizations. Also, we were 
reluctant to ask the same participant to determine the categorization of a stimulus at 
both the superordinate and the subordinate level, since the outcome of one judgment 
might bias the other judgment. Therefore, the approach we adopted was to request 
each participant to make about half the categorization decisions at the subordinate 
level and about the other half at the superordinate level. So, for example, if a 
participant had to decide whether the piano stimulus was a ‘piano’ (subordinate) she 
would not be asked to decide whether it would be a ‘musical instrument’ 
(superordinate) as well. Each participant received a booklet with the 11 stimuli. 
Approximately half the participants were asked to make subordinate classifications 
for the items ‘loudspeaker’, ‘MS Word’, ‘bed’, piano’ and ‘hammer’ and 
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superordinate classifications for ‘car’, ‘football’, ‘figurine’, ‘tunnels’, ‘box’, and 
‘money’; vice versa for the rest of the participants.  
 Participants were told that they would receive some A5 sheets with short 
descriptions for a series of items and that they would have to make a classification 
decision for each of these items. The materials presented the items and prompted the 
participant for a response for each item, so that after the initial instructions no further 
interaction was required between the experimenter and the participants. To clarify, all 
participants saw the same item descriptions but different participants were asked to 
make a different combination of (superordinate or subordinate) classifications for the 
items.  
The experiment was run at the start of a psychology class. Participants were 
provided with the instructions and then they received a little booklet with the items. 
They were told to mark their responses and give the booklet to the experimenter, 
before leaving the lecture theatre. Participants were not rushed to finish their 
responses (those who did not want to participate simply did not return the booklets). 
The experiment lasted for about five minutes.  
 
Results 
There were four missing responses out of the total of 122*11=1342 responses. The 
objective of the analyses is to examine the hypothesis that an item would be more 
likely to be endorsed (that is, accepted as a category member) at the subordinate level 
(rich representation) compared to the superordinate level (sparse representation). We 
conducted an item-based analysis and a participant-based one. The conclusion from 
both analyses was the same and supports our hypothesis.  
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 In the item-based analysis, we compared, for each item, the percentage of 
times it was endorsed at the subordinate level with the endorsement rate at the 
superordinate level (Table 3). For example, how often was the piano item accepted as 
a ‘piano’ and how often was it accepted as a ‘musical instrument’? Recall that for a 
particular item different participants would make the subordinate classification from 
the participants who made the superordinate one. A Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for 
paired samples comparing mean endorsement rates at the superordinate and 
subordinate levels was significant (Z=1.956, p=.05, two-tailed). The choice of a non-
parametric test is justified in this case, since there was no a priori reason to expect that 
the mean endorsement rates for different items would be uniform: the mean 
endorsement rate for different items would depend on the perceived importance of the 
feature change. As Table 3 shows, in all cases the endorsement rate at the subordinate 
level was higher than the endorsement rate at the superordinate level, as hypothesized, 
with two exceptions: in the case of the ‘fakir’s bed’ item, endorsement at the two 
levels was nearly equal. Also, in the case of the ‘MS Word’ item, endorsement at the 
superordinate level was much higher compared to endorsement at the subordinate 
level (0.80 vs. 0.24). Informal debriefing indicated that participants had 
misunderstood our description for this item: they considered the computer virus to be 
an instance of ‘software’, even if the malfunctioning word processor may no longer be 
classifiable as ‘software’. Note that when eliminating the ‘MS Word’ item the 
comparison of the endorsement rates between superordinate and subordinate levels is 
significant at the .007 level (Z=2.701; same test as above).  
 In the participant-based analysis, we computed the average endorsement rate 
of each participant at the superordinate and subordinate level. Recall that each 
participant made six or five classification decisions at the superordinate level and six 
critical features  21 
or five classification decisions at the subordinate level. The average endorsement rate 
at the subordinate level was .47 (SD=.23) and at the superordinate level .38 (SD=.21; 
an endorsement rate of 1 implies that a participant endorsed all items as members of 
their respective categories), a difference which was significant with a paired-samples 
t-test: t(121)=3.448, p=.001. Note that in this case there would be no justification to 
employ a non-parametric test, since, under the experimental hypothesis, all 
participants ought to be more likely to endorse an item at the subordinate level, 




It appears that when the same feature is changed in a superordinate category (fewer 
features) it is more likely to lead to a category change for an object, than when it is 
changed in a subordinate category (more features). This result is consistent with our 
suggestion, that a single feature change is more likely to look critical when a 
representation is sparser, compared to a situation when it is richer. In Experiment 2, 
we are therefore led to the same conclusion as in Experiment 1, despite the 
differences in methodology and materials.   
At the subordinate level, around 53% of object classification decisions 
indicated a change in object identity as a result of the feature change (at the 
superordinate level, this percentage was about 62%). This indicates that the feature we 
changed for each object was considered important for this object’s identity by many 
of the participants, thus partly validating the design. Note that different participants 
are likely to consider different features as important for an object’s representation (cf. 
Larochelle, Cousineau, & Archambault, 2005). Equally, the a priori salience of the 
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different features which were assumed critical might vary between participants. 
Consider what would happen even if there were huge differences in the salience of the 
assumed critical features (noting that we do not think this is the case, based on the 
obtained results): if an assumed critical feature was completely not-salient, then 
changing it should not reduce the identity judgments, regardless of whether the 
corresponding object was described in a superordinate or subordinate way. If an 
assumed critical feature was extremely salient, then changing it might lead to 
uniformly ‘different’ judgments, also regardless of whether the corresponding object 
was described in a superordinate or subordinate way. Therefore, at the very worst, 
differences in feature salience might increase the likelihood of the null hypothesis, 
but, crucially, this does not affect the validity of the dependent variable (which was 
the difference in identity judgments, depending on whether an object was described in 
a superordinate or subordinate way). Table 3 shows the item-by-item endorsement 
rates at the subordinate and superordinate level. While there were differences in 
whether the transformed objects were considered to be in the same category as the 
original ones, in nearly all cases the endorsement rate at the superordinate level is 
lower compared to the subordinate level (a notable exception concerns the item ‘MS 
Word’, but, as noted above, it appears that participants interpreted this item in an 
unintended way).  
Another potential problem with Experiment 2 is this: suppose that 
classification has nothing to do with sparsity but rather with the ease in which 
participants can imagine alternative classifications for an object. For example, 
suppose that participants produce more ‘same’ responses in relation to subordinate 
classifications rather than superordinate ones, simply because it is less easy to 
imagine alternative subordinate classifications compared to alternative superordinate 
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ones. For example, an object that is described as a hammer does not really have any 
alternative classifications. However, an object which is described as a tool might 
conceivably be described as a toy as well (we thank an anonymous reviewer for this 
suggestion). In general, while there are certain superordinate classifications which are 
widely applicable (such as toy), this is not universally true. For example, what is an 
alternative superordinate categorization for currency or furniture? It seems as difficult 
to imagine alternative classifications with respect to such superordinate categories as 
it is for their respective subordinate ones. Therefore, we do not think that this is a 
confounding factor in Experiment 2.  
A statistical concern regarding the analytical approach we adopted in 
Experiment 2 relates to whether we are justified as considering participants’ decisions 
for different items as independent. The assumption of independence would be 
supported by the fact that the items were unrelated to each other. Not making this 
assumption would imply that we believe that if a participant responded ‘not a 
category member’ for one item he/she was more likely to respond ‘not a category 
member for another item’. However, this seems implausible (cf. Hampton et al., 
2007). 
Finally, we can consider whether if one was asked to classify a soft rubbery 
thing that looked like a ‘hammer’, what alternative is there but to call it a ‘hammer’? 
Crucially, we did not ask participants to produce a name for the changed object, but 
rather examine whether it should be classified in a particular category or not. There 
are countless instances of items which we decide not to classify into one of our 
existing categories, but for which we do not have an alternative classification readily 
available. 
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Overall, a simple explanatory framework, based on Tversky’s (1977) theory of 
similarity, proved sufficient to account for when feature changes are more likely to 
lead to changes in object identity and when they are not.  
 
General discussion 
There has been an increasing consensus against critical features in concept 
representation. However, effects which seem like critical feature effects do exist and 
beg the question of how they occur. The purpose of this work was to provide some 
clarification along these lines, by modifying Rips’s (1989) experimental paradigm and 
utilizing a standard theory of similarity (Tversky, 1977). Our suggestion was that 
certain feature changes might seem critical, because the object representation is sparse 
(so that changing any particular feature might trigger a change in identity), but not if it 
is complex (so that when there are several features present, changing any one of them 
would have a relatively weak effect; cf. Hampton, 1995). In Experiment 1, we 
confirmed these expectations with schematic, artificial stimuli. Experiment 2 provided 
the more compelling test of our hypothesis, with real stimuli.  
 The null hypothesis in this investigation was that a feature change is 
considered either important (and hence leading to a change in identity) or 
unimportant, regardless of whether an object’s representation is sparse or complex. 
However, in both experiments we found that (the same) feature changes were more 
likely to lead to an identity change when the object representations were sparse. Thus, 
our findings provide some insight into both the way critical feature effects arise and 
also into the nature of object representation and similarity theory. Of course, this is 
not to say that research like ours ‘proves’ that critical features do not exist for all 
concepts. Clearly, there are practical constraints in the range of concepts which can be 
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considered in any specific study and one cannot preclude the possibility that there are 
specific (artifact) concepts for which category membership is defined by critical 
features.  
 Another limitation in the generality of this conclusion is that we considered 
only artifact categories. One can reasonably ask whether our conclusions would 
extend to natural kinds. Methodologically, the emphasis on artifact concepts makes 
sense: with artifacts, it is fairly straightforward to specify putative critical features 
(e.g., their function; Bloom, 1996). It is much less clear what would be the critical 
features for most natural kind categories (Rips, 2001). Following Rips (1989), one 
might suggest that for living organisms ‘mating’ might correspond to a sufficient 
feature for certain categories. However, as we have seen, not all investigations have 
supported this conclusion (e.g., Pothos & Hahn, 2000). More importantly, some 
researchers have argued that critical features do not apply at all in the case of natural 
kinds, rather what drives categorization is a belief into ‘essences’, that is, hidden, 
underlying characteristics that make the members of natural kind categories to be 
what they are (Malt, 1990; Medin & Ortony, 1989; cf. Medin, Wattenmaker, & 
Hampson, 1987). As one might expect, contrasting similarity and essentialist accounts 
of categorization is complicated by the fact that, typically (and almost by definition), 
we do not know what the relevant essences for different categories are. A recent 
attempt (Pothos et al., 2009) has produced support for both purely similarity-based 
categorization and essentialist categorization, but these investigators did not employ 
the sparse-complex methodology developed here. With future work we hope to carry 
out such an investigation and so examine whether the sparse-complex framework 
might explain (part of) essentialist categorization effects.  
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Table 1. Number of participants considering most of the test items to be ‘Chomps’ or 
not, in Experiment 1.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
                                    Test items ‘Chomps’                          Test items not ‘Chomps’  
              
   ––––––––––––––––––––––  ––––––––––––––––––––––– 
–––––––––––––– 
Simple condition  9     33 
  
Complex condition  22     20 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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Changed feature Actual question used in the task 
Piano* Piano/ musical instrument 
Converted to a mini-bar. The object above has had all of its internal workings removed  
and replaced by a minibar. 
Football* Football/ sporting 
equipment 
The football that is part of the  
World  Cup Trophy. 
In the above picture, part of a famous sporting trophy is 
highlighted with an arrow. 
Fakirs bed* Bed/ furniture Bed with nails. The picture above is of an object on which Indian fakirs are 
sometimes seen to lie down. 
Doll* Doll/ plaything A Chinese figurine made of porcelain. Look at the object above; it is Chinese a figurine and it 
 is made of porcelain. 
Hammer* Hammer/ tool A soft rubber hammer. On his retirement, a builder is given the above object by his 
colleagues.  It is made entirely of very soft rubber. 
Loudspeaker Loudspeaker/ stereo 
equipment 
Converted to a nest for birds. The back of an old loudspeaker is removed, and it is filled  
with straw to make a bird’s nest. 
Word Word-processor/ 
software 
A virus means that every time a key is pressed 
beep sounds and nothing else happens. 
A computer virus has changed Microsoft Word into a program 
which just makes a beeping sound whenever any keys on the 
keyboard are pressed, so that no writing is possible. 
Coin Coins/ money 
Economy of a country collapses so that  
the currency cannot be used for  
monetary exchanges. 
After a series of financial disasters, the economy of a  
country collapses so that the country’s currency is worthless,  
and cannot be used to buy anything. 
Porsche Car/ vehicle A steel replica of a Porsche car  
outside the Porsche headquarters 
Outside the headquarters of the Porsche car company, a  
stainless steel replica of a Porsche stands on a pedestal. 
Tunnel House/ building A network of tunnels is converted so that 
 people can live in it.  
A network of tunnels is dug into the ground, and furnished  
so that people can live in it. 
Box Cardboard box/  
container  
A cardboard is flattened.  A cardboard box is cut down the sides so that it becomes 
 a flat piece of cardboard. 
Note: A ‘*’ indicates that the description of an item was supplemented with a picture.  
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Table 3. The percentage endorsement rate for each item, when participants were asked 
to classify it in a superordinate or corresponding subordinate category.  
 
Item  Subordinate  Superordinate 
piano   0.5  0.25 
football 0.43  0.31 
fakirs bed 0.32  0.35 
doll  0.77  0.18 
hammer 0.63  0.37 
loudspeaker 0.40  0.33 
MS word 0.24  0.80 
coin  0.80  0.70 
Porsche 0.35  0.27 
tunnel  0.47  0.37 
box  0.30  0.19 
   
Average 0.47  0.37 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. A list of all the stimuli employed in the Simple condition of Experiment 1. 
Each participant was tested with only one set of Test Items. The stimuli in the 
Complex condition were the same, except for the fact that (the same) four additional 
features were added below each of the stimuli in the Simple condition (this is 
illustrated for one of the Training Items). The three sets of Test Items partly 
counterbalance which feature was changed. 
 
Figure 2. An illustration of the idea that superordinate classifications involve fewer 
features than subordinate ones. Each circle represents a binary feature, that is the 
feature is either present or absent. Black circles correspond to features which are a) 
present b) common to all the members of a particular category. Therefore, the black 
circles for each category indicate the representation of the category (in terms of 
features). The bottom part of the figure shows two subordinate categories. Their 
members have quite high overlap, there are four features common to all members. 
The top part shows a corresponding superordinate category. This category contains all 
the exemplars of the two subordinate categories. However, one can readily see that 
the only feature which is present and shared by all the exemplars of the superordinate 
category is the middle one. This illustrates the idea that the superordinate category has 
a sparser representation compared to the subordinate ones.  
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Figures  
Figure 1 [on the following page]
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Training Items: 
       
 
Test Items – Set 1: 
         
 
Test Items – Set 2:  
          
 
Test Items – Set 3: 




items with this 
addition.  
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Figure 2.  
 
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3Item 1 Item 2 Item 3
Subordinate category 2
Superordinate category
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3Item 1 Item 2 Item 3
Subordinate category 1
 
